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ABSTRACT 
Encouraged by technological advancements and favorable pro-
visions within the Affordable Care Act, telemedicine companies 
that offer online doctor visits are thriving in the health care in-
dustry. Online doctor visits are a relatively new and cost-efficient 
method to provide medical care over long distances that do not 
require patients to step outside their homes. However, many state 
medical board scope-of-practice rules prohibit physicians from pre-
scribing medications without an in-person physical examination 
of the patient, which impedes telemedicine companies from offering 
their online services in those states. To circumvent this barrier, 
telemedicine companies may have a prima facie case under § 1 of 
the Sherman Act to strike down those professional regulations. After 
the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners v. FTC, state medical boards composed of a 
majority of market participants likely do not enjoy Parker Immunity 
from the Sherman Act under the state action doctrine because 
they are active participants in the physician services market. 
That decision, along with the lessons learned from the district 
court proceedings in Teladoc v. Texas Medical Board, offers a 
framework for telemedicine companies to explore future Sherman 
Act challenges to restrictive state drug prescription rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In spring of 2015, UnitedHealthcare released a television com-
mercial showcasing a couple dancing to the tune “(I’ve Had) The 
Time of My Life” of Dirty Dancing1 fame.2 While trying to recre-
ate the climatic dance scene when Johnny held Baby in the air,3 
the couple topples to the ground, breaks a table, and injures them-
selves.4 As the commercial ends, the couple consults with a phy-
sician, not through a traditional office visit, but through an Internet 
webcam.5 The commercial was an attempt by UnitedHealthcare 
to entice consumers to try their virtual clinic services (also known as 
online doctor visits).6 Advertising giant Leo Burnett claimed the 
commercial was part of the “biggest direct-to-consumer advertising 
campaign in the history of [UnitedHealthcare],” noting that the 
health insurance company previously advertised to employers, 
rather than consumers.7 In light of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
and creation of health care exchanges, the goal of the commercial 
was to advertise directly to consumers who did not have insur-
ance through an employer.8 Importantly, that advertisement 
                                                                                                            
1 DIRTY DANCING (Great American Films Ltd. P’ship 1987). 
2 Our Song Commercial, UNITEDHEALTHCARE (March 15, 2015), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9YiTIYO-2A [https://perma.cc/H2TA-98X5] [herein-
after UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL]. UnitedHealthcare is one of the largest 
health care companies in the United States. UnitedHealth Group, the parent 
company of UnitedHealthcare, ranked number 6 on the 2016 Fortune 500 list and 
is one of the most dominant industry players in the health insurance and 
Managed Care sectors. UnitedHealth Group, FORTUNE (2016), http://beta.for 
tune.com/fortune500/unitedhealth-group-6/ [https://perma.cc/4PVV-N7AY]. 
3 DIRTY DANCING, supra note 1. 
4 UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL, supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. Online doctor visits are an application of telemedicine, which is for-
mally defined as the “use of medical information exchanged from one site to 
another via electronic communications to improve a patient’s clinical health sta-
tus.” What is Telemedicine, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.american 
telemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.Vgqxm4_BzGc [https:// 
perma.cc/7P2J-AU9L]. 
7 LEO BURNETT, How UnitedHealthcare “Came in Hot” With Its Biggest Con-
sumer Ad Push, (Aug. 21, 2015), http://leoburnett.com/articles/work/how-united 
healthcare-came-in-hot-with-its-biggest-consumer-ad-push/ [https://perma.cc/8J 
UC-VNFU]. 
8 Id. 
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demonstrates the relevancy of telemedicine9 in the contemporary 
American health care system, and it implied that online doctor 
visits are a desirable service for many consumers in a digital age.10 
This Note contributes to the scarce legal literature concerning 
telemedicine companies that provide online consultations between 
patients and physicians.11 This includes companies such as Virtu-
well, ConsultADoctor, Specialists On Call, LiveHealth Online, and 
HealthTap, as well as industry leaders Teladoc and MDLive, whose 
business models revolve around servicing online doctor visits.12 
Those telemedicine companies typically contract with individ-
uals, large companies, hospitals, or health insurers.13 Already, 
two major health care insurers, Aetna and UnitedHealthcare, have 
partnered with telemedicine companies to provide online physician 
services for their members, which demonstrates that the health 
care community is welcoming telemedicine with open arms.14 
                                                                                                            
9 It is important to distinguish between the terms “telemedicine” and “tele-
health,” as they are mistakenly used interchangeably. For the purposes of this 
Note, “telemedicine” will refer to the actual delivery of remote clinical ser-
vices, which mirrors the language of both the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the American Telemedicine Association (ATA). 
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Telehealth: Glossary & Acro-
nyms, http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox/RuralHealthITtoolbox/Telehealth 
/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/5S78-T4TF]; What is Telemedicine?, AM. TELE-
MEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.americantelemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is 
-telemedicine#.VgQURJNViko [https://perma.cc/7P2J-AU9L]. “Telehealth,” on 
the other hand, is a broader term that covers more than clinical health care 
delivery, and includes transmissions of health care information and educa-
tional programs such as WebMD. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., Telehealth: Glossary & Acronyms, http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox 
/RuralHealthITtoolbox/Telehealth/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/5S78-T4TF]. 
10 See UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL, supra note 2. 
11 For convenience, this Note will use the broad term “telemedicine com-
pany” to refer only to private companies that service online doctor visits, even 
though that term also encompasses companies that engage in other forms of 
telemedicine such as remote patient monitoring. 
12 See Online Doctor Consultation Services, VSEE, https://vsee.com/blog/on 
line-doctor-consultation [https://perma.cc/5DU2-TUJQ] (describing payment plans 
and consultation costs for major telemedicine companies) [hereinafter VSEE]. 
13 Id.; see also Olga Kharif, Telemedicine: Doctor Visits via Video Calls, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014 
-02-27/health-insurers-add-telemedicine-services-to-cut-costs [https://perma.cc 
/H6T8-T7S4]. 
14 See Mary Delsener, Telemedicine & The Courts: Teladoc v. Texas Medi-
cal Board as a Case Study, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2015). 
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However, some state prescription drug rules act as barriers 
that prohibit the increased use of online doctor visits.15 While 
those conferencing services provide several advantages,16 some 
state medical boards inhibit the further implementation of these 
programs because their rules require a physician to perform an 
in-person physical examination of a patient in order for the phy-
sician to prescribe medications.17 Medical boards justify these rules 
as preserving the establishment of the patient-physician rela-
tionship, and for drug abuse and injury prevention purposes.18 
Some state medical board rules are tailored to prevent “tele-
medicine abortions.”19 Other state rules, however, are broader 
and attempt to prevent physicians from writing any prescription 
without an in-person physical examination of the patient.20 While 
the first category of rules may be unconstitutional as an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to seek an abortion,21 the second 
category of rules are a direct threat to telemedicine companies in 
that they could very possibly limit the further expansion of 
online medical services.22 State prescription rules are just one of 
                                                                                                            
15 This Note discusses two of the most common types of state prescription 
rules that negatively impede telemedicine: (1) “telemedicine abortion” rules 
and (2) in-person physical examination requirement rules for prescriptions. 
See infra Parts II.A–B. 
16 Advantages of online doctor consultations include lower travel costs, 
lower costs of physician visits, quicker access to medical care, and increased 
output of physician services. See infra Parts I.A.1–4. 
17 According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), most states require 
a physical examination as the basis for prescribing and dispensing prescrip-
tion drugs. See CDC, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REQUIRE-
MENTS 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/pdpe-requirements 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ9G-H386] (listing state prescription drug rules as 
enacted through December 4, 2013) [hereinafter CDC STUDY]. 
18 See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
19 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 
N.W.2d 252, 264, 268–69 (Iowa 2015) (holding an Iowa rule that forbade 
medicated abortions without an in-person physical examination as unconsti-
tutional because it placed an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate 
her pregnancy). 
20 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 2. 
21 See supra note 19. 
22 Aware of that threat, Teladoc, one of the largest telemedicine compa-
nies, was successful in enjoining the Texas Medical Board when they promul-
gated an anticompetitive rule that required a “face-to-face visit or in-person 
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many roadblocks for telemedicine companies,23 yet telemedicine 
companies may be able to challenge state medical board rules 
requiring in-person examinations under federal antitrust law. 
The 2015 Supreme Court decision in North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC offers potential for future suc-
cessful antitrust challenges to rules promulgated by state profes-
sional agencies.24 In N.C. Dental, a state dental board’s rule was 
scrutinized under § 1 of the Sherman Act, because the Court re-
jected the argument that rules promulgated by the dental board 
were protected under the antitrust state action doctrine.25 
Around the same time as the N.C. Dental decision, a federal district 
court in Texas enjoined the Texas Medical Board from promulgating 
a rule that required a physician to conduct a face-to-face examina-
tion with the patient before prescribing controlled substances.26 
The lessons learned from the Teladoc case, along with the hold-
ing in N.C. Dental, provide the basis for future antitrust lawsuits 
challenging state medical board rules that require physicians to 
conduct an in-person physical examination of the patient before 
writing a prescription.27 This Note predicts that rules requiring 
                                                                                                            
evaluation before a physician can issue a prescription.” Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. 
Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 534 (W.D. Tex. 2015). For an in-depth discus-
sion of that case, see infra Part V. 
23 See Brittney Bauerly, Telemedicine in Rural Communities: Navigating the 
Legal Issues in this New Frontier of Health Care Delivery, NETWORK FOR PUB. 
HEALTH L. (Dec. 8, 2015, 2:54 PM), https://www.networkforphl.org/the_network 
_blog/2015/12/08/726/telemedicine_in_rural_communities_navigating_the_legal 
_issues _in_this_new_frontier_of_health_care_delivery/?utm_source=Network 
+Report+12-10-15&utm_campaign=Network+Report+12-10-15&utm _medium 
=email&ut m_content=184 [https://perma.cc/XFR4-T3QA] (noting that prob-
lems facing telemedicine companies include reimbursement, professional 
licensing, medical malpractice, data privacy, and FDA regulation concerns). 
24 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–11, 
1114–17 (2015). 
25 Id. First articulated in the 1943 Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown, 
the state action doctrine provides state or local governments federal antitrust 
immunity. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351, 359, 361–63, 367–68 
(1942). Today, the state action doctrine is synonymous with the phrase “Parker 
immunity.” See Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity 
and the Collateral Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE UNIV. 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015). For a complete discussion of the antitrust state action 
doctrine, see infra Part IV.A. 
26 Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543–44. 
27 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1112–14; Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543–44. 
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in-person physical examinations for prescriptions will not be 
afforded Parker immunity28 under the state action doctrine if 
the state medical board is not actively supervised by the state. 
Thus, telemedicine companies may succeed in challenging those 
rules under § 1 because those rules can be considered concerted 
actions that unreasonably restrict telemedicine physicians from 
participating in the physician services market within a certain 
state. While state prescription rules vary from state to state, 
antitrust challenges to state medical board regulations will likely 
require a more detailed analysis than the per se framework.29 
Instead, a court would likely apply the quick-look or rule of rea-
son analysis.30 Under either the quick-look or rule of reason, a 
state prescription rule would probably only survive if the state 
medical board could advance the procompetitive justification of 
decreased health care costs stemming from drug injury and 
abuse prevention.31 
This Note is organized to address the issues previously men-
tioned in turn. Section I offers a brief history and insight on the 
relatively new business models of telemedicine companies that 
offer online doctor visits, and how employers, health care provid-
ers, and associated industries are posed to benefit. Section II notes 
the two most common types of state prescription drug rules that 
hinder further expansion of online doctor services: “telemedicine 
abortion” rules and in-person examination requirements. Sec-
tion III describes § 1 of the Sherman Act and how it affects the 
health care industry. Section IV looks at the § 1 tests used to 
preempt state rules under the antitrust state action doctrine, 
and discusses the impact of the 2015 Supreme Court case N.C. 
Dental on Parker immunity and state medical boards. Section V 
uses the framework of the Teladoc district court case and hy-
pothesizes potential § 1 challenges to state prescription drug 
rules that require in-person physical examinations. 
                                                                                                            
28 Parker immunity grants a state actor immunity from federal antitrust 
suits only if the actor (1) manifests a clearly articulated policy to displace 
federal antitrust law; and (2) is actively supervised by public state officials. 
See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 386 (4th ed. 
2013). For more on Parker immunity, see infra Part IV.A. 
29 See infra Part V.C. 
30 See infra Parts V.D.–E. 
31 See infra Parts V.D.–E. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF TELEMEDICINE AND 
ONLINE DOCTOR VISITS 
Remote physician consultations, a precursor to online doctor 
visits, began as early as the 1950s when health care providers 
began to explore new ways to tackle the “access to care” issue in 
rural areas.32 In 1959, a Nebraska hospital used a two-way tele-
vision to transmit medical information, which prompted a few 
other hospitals around the country to use similar technologies.33 
However, most early telemedicine practices were not tremen-
dously successful and interest dropped off in the mid-1980s, likely 
due to high transmission costs.34 Yet, the Internet revolution in 
the 1990s prompted interest in renewing remote physician con-
sultations through online services.35 
As recent as the early 2000s, independent telemedicine com-
panies have sprung up across the United States.36 Telemedicine 
companies that specifically provide online doctor visits arguably 
began to incorporate in 2002.37 While it is hard to identify the “first” 
telemedicine company, MyDoc may have been the first company 
to provide online doctor consultations in 2002.38 However, MyDoc 
quickly faced difficulties due to hostile state prescription rules 
and had to discontinue their online services for several years.39 
                                                                                                            
32 TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH 
CARE 36 (Marilyn J. Field ed., 1996), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK 
45448/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK45448.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJS8-E4TA]. 
33 Id. at 36–38. 
34 Id. at 40. The most interesting failure in early telecommunications doc-
tor consulting may be the STARPHAC project—a collaborative effort between 
the United States Indian Health Service, NASA, and the Lockheed Missiles and 
Space Company—that aimed to provide medical services through satellite-based 
communications to astronauts and rural Native American reservations. Id. at 39. 
35 See Gunther Eysenbach, Towards the Millennium of Cybermedicine, J. 
MED. INTERNET RES. (Sept. 19, 1999), http://www.jmir.org/1999/suppl1/e2 [https:// 
perma.cc/24SR-JPSA] (“The Internet and related new communication technol-
ogies enable health professionals to reach large populations with interactive 
applications, which in turn opens enormous opportunities and challenges.”). 
36 See Tyler Chin, Doctor-Founded Company a Phone-Only Practice, AMED 
NEWS (May 23, 2005), http://www.amednews.com/article/20050523/business 
/305239992/7/ [https://perma.cc/L9ZB-7N74]. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. However, as of 2015, MyDoc offers online services again. See 
MYDOC, https://www.my-doc.com/patients [https://perma.cc/4RNC-QDLY]. 
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In recent years, advancements in accessible, low-cost technology 
have contributed to the recent success of online doctor services as 
mobile technology such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets are 
now readily available to many Americans.40 Recent studies demon-
strate that 64 percent of Americans own smartphones.41 From 
that pool of smartphone owners, 62 percent have used their phone 
to look up information about a health condition.42 Not surprisingly, 
telemedicine company GlobalMed claims mobile technology allows 
a patient to transmit vital sign information to their doctor, who can 
respond and treat the patient appropriately.43 As more and more 
Americans gain access to mobile technology, the greater the po-
tential for companies that service products through that medium. 
Today, online doctor visits provide several procompetitive mar-
ketplace advantages relevant to an antitrust industry analysis. 
A. Procompetitive Advantages of Online Doctor Visits 
Online doctor visits may be one of the most promising appli-
cations of telecommunication technology in the health care in-
dustry.44 These visits can take the form of a video conference 
between the patient and the doctor, or they may involve no visual 
contact between patient and physician at all.45 Decreased costs, 
                                                                                                            
40 Studies show 90 percent of American adults own a cell phone and 42 
percent own a tablet computer. PEW RES. CTR., MOBILE TECHNOLOGY FACT 
SHEET (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact 
-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/5Q89-7NPA]. 
41 PEW RES. CTR., U.S. SMARTPHONE USE IN 2015, at 2 (April 1, 2015), http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/EC7Z-UTX5]. 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 New Trends in Telehealth Technology, GLOBALMED, http://www.global 
med.com/additional-resources/new-trends-in-telehealth-technology.php [https:// 
perma.cc/87WG-Q2ER]. 
44 See Bruce Japsen, With ACA, Telemedicine In ‘Perfect Storm’ for Cover-
age, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen 
/2014/12/09/with-aca-telemedicine-in-perfect-storm-for-coverage/ [https://perma 
.cc/D7HY-KT55]. 
45 Technology, Media & Telecommunications Predictions, DELOITTE, at 20 
(2014), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technol 
ogy-Media-Telecommunications/gx-tmt-predictions-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/HE26-KQEQ] [hereinafter Technology, Media & Telecommunications Pre-
dictions]. While video conferencing may be the first application of virtual 
doctor visits that comes to mind, Deloitte predicts that the vast majority of 
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increased output, and increased quality of care are the hall-
marks of a procompetitive business practice relevant to an anti-
trust analysis.46 Recent data suggests that online doctor visits 
offer several procompetitive advantages—lower travel costs, lower 
health care expenditures, quicker access to medical care, and 
increased output of physician services.47 Those procompetitive 
advantages are discussed in the following subsections.48 
1. Lower Travel Costs 
First, online doctor visits can greatly reduce the amount of 
time patients spend traveling and reduces travel-associated costs. 
Consulting with a physician from your mobile device or home 
computer cuts down on the patient’s travel time to the physi-
cian’s office. A 2006 research study noted that the distance to 
the physician’s office was directly proportional to the number of 
office visits.49 It is axiomatic that eliminating the need to travel 
to a doctor, especially for rural patients who live far from their 
medical providers, reduces travel costs. 
2. Lower Health Care Expenditures 
Second, online doctor visits are less expensive than typical 
in-person primary care visits. The cost of a single online doctor 
                                                                                                            
virtual doctor visits in the future will involve no visual contact. The patient 
would submit forms and photos documenting their medical condition and send it 
via Internet to the physician, who would respond with a diagnosis or pre-
scription. Id. However, twenty-five states currently prohibit a physician from 
prescribing medications solely on electronic patient questionnaires. See CDC 
STUDY, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
46 See R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Paper, Pri-
vate Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ATR DIV., 1–2 (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default 
/files/atr/legacy/2006/12/27/220040.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN8A-YYJM] (“The 
antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and 
deter anticompetitive actions…. Competition lowers prices and increases firms’ 
incentives to innovate, to the benefit of consumers.”). 
47 See infra Parts I.A.1–4. 
48 See id. 
49 W.T. Cecil, et al., Relationship of the Use and Costs of Physician Office 
Visits and Prescription Drugs to Travel Distances and Increases in Member 
Cost Share, 12 J. MANAGED CARE PHARM. 665, 673 (Oct. 2006), http://amcp 
.org/data/jmcp/Cecil%20article.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RBG-YLRH]. 
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visit typically costs a patient between $40 to $50.50 A typical in-
person primary care visit, on the other hand, costs uninsured pa-
tients $150 on average and privately insured patients around $49.51 
Moreover, some private health insurers such as UnitedHealthcare 
and Anthem cover all the costs of online doctor visits provided 
by select telemedicine companies.52 Thus, patients enrolled in 
certain private insurance plans pay no out-of-pocket costs for 
online doctor visits.53 
3. Quicker Access to Medical Care 
Third, telemedicine companies make an effort to promote how 
quick it is to access a doctor through their online consultation 
services.54 Industry leader, Teladoc, claims that physician re-
sponse time was less than ten minutes on average.55 In other words, 
on average it takes less than ten minutes to contact and set up 
an immediate appointment with a physician using Teladoc’s ser-
vices.56 Moreover, online clinics are typically open twenty-four 
hours, seven days a week.57 In-person visits, on the other hand, 
may take days to weeks to occur after the patient calls to re-
quest an appointment.58 Wait times for in-person doctor visits 
                                                                                                            
50 See VSEE, supra note 12. 
51 See Primary care visits available to most uninsured but at a high price, 
JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH (May 5, 2015), http:// 
www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2015/primary-care-visits-available-to-most 
-uninsured-but-at-a-high-price.html [https://perma.cc/64XD-9SRH]. 
52 Abby Goodnough, Modern Doctors’ House Calls: Skype Chat and Fast 
Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12 /health 
/modern-doctors-house-calls-skype-chat-and-fast-diagnosis.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/UK27-55BJ]. 
53 See id. 
54 See VSEE, supra note 12 (listing various telemedicine companies and 
their response times to patient requests for an online visit). 
55 How does it work?, TELADOC, http://www.teladoc.com/how-does-it-work/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PN5-98BP]. 
56 See id. 
57 Telemedicine companies Virtuwell, ConsultADoctor, Specialists On Call, 
LiveHealth Online, HealthTap, MDLive, and Teladoc all claim to provide 24/7 
access to doctors through their online consulting services. See VSEE, supra 
note 12. 
58 Physician Appointment Wait Times and Medicaid and Medicare Accep-
tance Rates, MERRITT HAWKINS (2014), http://www.merritthawkins.com/up 
loadedFilesMerrittHawkings/Surveys/mha2014waitsurvPDF.pdf [https://perma 
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vary wildly according to location in the United States. According 
to a 2014 survey, it may take only five days to schedule and see 
a doctor in Dallas, Texas, but up to sixty-six days in Boston, 
Massachusetts.59 One study demonstrated that online doctor 
visits resulted in quicker visits and, consequently, less follow-up 
visits, thereby reducing health care costs.60 
4. Increased Output of Physician Services 
Fourth, physicians are able to consult more patients by using 
online consulting technologies. Sources are scarce to support 
that notion, however one telemedicine company successfully 
introduced evidence to support that fact in a recent antitrust 
case.61 In that case, physicians testified that online consulta-
tions allowed them to treat more patients and practice medicine 
on a more flexible schedule.62 While that testimony derived from 
affidavits,63 it is conceivable that a study of publishable quality 
could come to the same conclusion and offer more light on this 
procompetitive advantage. 
B. Potential Business Impact on Other Industries 
In the last two decades, health care and social assistance has re-
placed the manufacturing industry as the single most dominant 
industry in the vast majority of states.64 While other industries 
were hit hard by the 2008 recession, the health care sector has 
                                                                                                            
.cc/DCP6-3N3A] (providing the average scheduling times for in-person doctor 
visits in different cities of the United States). 
59 Id. 
60 Lori Uscher-Pines & Ateev Mehrotra, Analysis of Teladoc use seems to 
indicate expanded access to care for patients without prior connection to a pro-
vider, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 258, 258 (Feb. 2014), http://content.healthaffairs 
.org/content/33/2/258 [https://perma.cc/4ABB-328G].  
61 See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 537 (W.D. Tex. 2015). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LARGEST INDUSTRIES BY STATE, 1990–2013 
(July 28, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140728.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/895L-2QJK]; see also Joshua Wright, Health care’s unrivaled job gains 
and where it matters most, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/emsi/2013/10/07/health-cares-unrivaled-job-gains-and-where-it-matters-most 
/#57f1a93b14a7 [https://perma.cc/7R39-LEDT]. 
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largely been resilient.65 In the near future, online doctor visits 
may become the preferred and easiest way to reach your doctor.66 
Employers, health care companies, and associated industries may 
all benefit from the success of telemedicine companies. 
1. Employers 
Some of our country’s largest non-healthcare employers, such 
as PepsiCo and Bank of America, offer online doctor visits to 
their employees in order to cut health care costs and make phy-
sicians more accessible.67 A 2015 survey based on responses from 
large American companies illuminated that this trend is likely 
to continue because around 74 percent of respondents planned to 
offer telehealth to employees in states where it is legal.68 
The final phase of the Affordable Care Act’s Employer Shared 
Responsibility Mandate (“employer mandate”)69 may further en-
courage large employers to use online doctor visits. As of 2016, 
the employer mandate applies to employers with fifty or more 
full-time employees or full-time equivalents (FTEs), and re-
quires those companies to offer affordable health insurance at a 
minimum value to their full-time employees or FTEs and their 
children up to the age of 26.70 If an applicable company fails to 
                                                                                                            
65 See Wright, supra note 64. 
66 Eric Topol, The future of medicine is in your smartphone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-future-of-medicine-is-in-your-smartphone 
-1420828632 [https://perma.cc/A9UF-WY2H] (noting that consulting firms Deloitte 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers forecasted “that virtual physician visits (replac-
ing in-office visits) will soon become the norm”). 
67 See Jayne O’Donnell & Benjamin Mitchell, Big telehealth firm to go public 
as remote doctor visits gain traction, USA TODAY (June 30, 2015), http://www 
.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/06/30/telehealth-ipo-teladoc-healthcare 
-costs/29482557/ [https://perma.cc/J7PB-B5HL] (stating that PepsiCo and Bank 
of America offer online doctor visits provided by Teladoc to their approximately 
11 million employees). 
68 Health care benefits cost increases to hold steady in 2016, National Busi-
ness Group on Health Survey Finds, NAT’L BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH (Aug. 12, 
2015), https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID= 
263 [https:// perma.cc/B85W-4T3R]. 
69 26 U.S.C. § 4980H. 
70 See id.; Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, CIGNA (May 2015), http://www 
.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/employer-mandate-fact 
-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4B-NTQE]. 
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comply, the IRS will issue a penalty to them.71 In other words, 
employers with fifty or more employees are required to provide af-
fordable health insurance at a minimum value to their employees 
and their children or face a fine. This could provide a major incen-
tive for more companies to utilize health plans that honor online 
doctor visits, or include them in their own group plans, because 
they are a cheaper method of health care administration than in-
person visits.72 
2. Health Care Providers 
Health care executives view telemedicine as an important 
component for the future of their companies.73 The ACA’s reim-
bursement guidelines may be one of the major factors in expand-
ing telemedicine policies, as many hospitals are switching from 
their prior fee-for-service model to a pay-for-performance reim-
bursement model.74 The pay-for-performance model reimburses 
federal health care funds according to (1) how well the health 
care provider performs in relation to other hospitals and (2) how 
much the provider improved their own performance.75 Thus, health 
care companies bare a greater risk for keeping patients healthy, 
                                                                                                            
71 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A). The penalty is calculated according to the 
gravity of the company’s failure to provide affordable health insurance at a 
minimum value. See id. In other words, if more of a certain company’s em-
ployees go elsewhere for coverage, or have to pay more than what is deter-
mined to be “affordable,” then the penalty will be larger (but still subject to a 
maximum amount). See Penalties for employers not offering coverage under 
the Affordable Care Act during 2016, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 2, 
2015), http://kff.org/infographic/employer-responsibility-under-the-affordable 
-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/CMV5-ZY36]. 
72 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
73 A recent study found that 90 percent of health care executives have either 
begun to develop or implement a telemedicine program. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 
2014 TELEMEDICINE SURVEY 1 (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.foley.com/files/Pub 
lication/0585f5b1-1205-4be7-be5a-4e14602a4fac/Presentation/PublicationAttach 
ment/39c25a9b-5ff1-4ee8-b861-4ea2d71718ae/2014%20Telemedicine%20Survey 
%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4KT-EQL8] [hereinafter 
FOLEY & LARDNER SURVEY]. 
74 Id. at 2. 
75 Linking quality to payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov 
/hospitalcompare/linking-quality-to-payment.html [https://perma.cc/W3R5 
-Z86D]. Changes to the health care reimbursement laws are generally found 
in Title III of the ACA. 124 Stat. 119. 
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and need to capitalize on innovative health care techniques such 
as video conferencing and other telemedicine practices.76 To sum 
up recent activity in the health care industry, Chief Executive 
Officer of telemedicine company MDLive, Randy Parker, observed 
that the ACA created “a perfect storm .... We are at a point where 
both technology and payers who are providing reimbursement 
have accepted the fact that there is an inflection point.”77 
3. Associated Industries 
Companies outside the health care industry are predicted to 
profit from telemedicine. At least one major technology company 
is testing the waters to join the health care industry because of 
the lucrative possibilities of telemedicine.78 In 2014, tech giant 
Google experimented with a trial telemedicine service.79 Con-
sulting firm Deloitte predicted that the technology and tele-
communications industries will profit in their response to the 
“growing demand for data volumes, quality of service data, high 
speed broadband ... and wireless networks.”80 Technology device 
manufacturers are also likely to benefit in expanding markets for 
mobile devices and mobile applications.81 With these predictions 
in mind, online doctor companies and associated industries may 
have a very profitable future. However, there are several poten-
tial roadblocks including reimbursement, professional licensing, 
medical malpractice, data privacy, U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration regulations, and fraud concerns.82 This Note does not 
discuss those hurdles; instead, it focuses on state prescription 
drug rules that prohibit prescriptions without an in-person visit. 
                                                                                                            
76 See FOLEY & LARDNER SURVEY, supra note 73, at 2. 
77 See Japsen, supra note 44. 
78 Amit Chowdhry, Google is testing a “Talk With a Doctor” feature within 
medical search results, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/amitchowdhry/2014/10/15/google-is-testing-a-talk-with-a-doctor-feature-within 
-medical-search-results/ [http://perma.cc/ALF6-ZDYB]. 
79 Id. Google users have the option to set up a video chat session with a 
doctor if they searched for certain medical symptoms on the Google search 
engine. Id. 
80 See Technology, Media & Telecommunications Predictions, supra note 45. 
81 See id. 
82 See Bauerly, supra note 23. 
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II. STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG RULE BARRIERS TO 
ONLINE DOCTOR VISITS 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves drugs 
marketed for prescription use.83 However state laws and rules—
not federal law—usually dictate the physical examination re-
quirements for medication prescriptions.84 While FDA imposes 
labeling requirements on drugs,85 the agency cannot regulate 
the practice of medicine. Instead, states fill the void of regulat-
ing the practice of medicine and impose rules on prescribers.86 
Pursuant to a state’s police power,87 state legislatures gener-
ally create medical boards to regulate the practice of medicine.88 
The state legislature dictates who is eligible to serve as a board 
member; physicians typically dominate the composition of the 
board, but some laypersons also serve as members.89 Through rules, 
medical boards generally regulate licensure, disciplinary proce-
dures, and scope-of-practice.90 Scope-of-practice regulations aim to 
define the “spheres of activity within which various types of 
health-care providers ... are authorized to practice.”91 It follows 
                                                                                                            
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (codifying the Durham-Humphrey Amendment 
and requiring a prescription for drugs that are not safe for self-medication 
(i.e., over-the-counter) purposes).  
84 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1 (“States have the primary responsi-
bility to regulate and enforce prescription drug practice.”). 
85 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (defining the content and formatting requirements 
of prescription drug labels). 
86 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1.  
87 The police power allows a state legislature to enact or delegate to another 
administrative body “reasonable regulations established directly by legislative 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.” Jacobson v. 
Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
88 Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical 
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 289 (2010). Some state medical 
boards are independent bodies, while others are part of a larger administration, 
such as a department of health. See Frequently Asked Questions About State 
Medical Boards, FED’N OF ST. MED. BDS., http://www.fsmb.org/policy/consumer 
-resources/frequent-questions [https://perma.cc/TX4G-PMDN]. 
89 See Sawicki, supra note 88, at 291–92; BARRY R. FURROW, HEALTH LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 87 (7th ed. 2013). 
90 Sawicki, supra note 88, at 290. 
91 Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-
Care Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. 
REG. 301, 302 (2002). 
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that regulations that define the circumstances and conditions 
that a physician must adhere to in order to prescribe prescription 
drugs are considered scope-of-practice regulations. The importance 
of state prescription drug rules as a scope-of-practice regulation 
comes into play later in this Note in the sections that cover the 
antitrust analysis and potential challenges to those rules.92 
State rules that forbid medication prescriptions without an 
in-person physical examination of the patient prevent telemedi-
cine companies from providing medication prescriptions through 
their online visits.93 The following sections, A and B, discuss the 
two most common types of rules that prevent telemedicine com-
panies from prescribing medications through their online services. 
A. “Telemedicine Abortion” Rules 
Restricting access to “telemedicine abortions” may be a prox-
imate cause behind some restrictive prescription rules. The term 
“telemedicine abortion” refers to a medicated abortion capable of 
being induced within your own home, without ever consulting a 
gynecologist in-person.94 The first stage involves an in-person 
visit with a nurse who administers an ultrasound test and lab 
work with the woman seeking an abortion.95 Afterwards, the 
woman conducts a video conference with a gynecologist to de-
termine if a medicated abortion is a proper option.96 If so, the 
gynecologist prescribes mifepristone and misoprostol, two pre-
scription drugs that cause the lining of the uterus to break down 
and empty, effectively inducing a medicated abortion without the 
woman entering a surgical room or an in-person meeting with a 
                                                                                                            
92 See infra Parts IV–V.  
93 For example, a Texas rule previously required a physician to conduct a 
“face-to-face” physical examination in order for them to prescribe prescription 
drugs. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(L) (2015). Telemedicine company, Teladoc, 
filed an antitrust suit against the administrative agency and a federal court 
granted an injunction against enforcement of that rule. See Teladoc, Inc. v. 
Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015). 
94 See Alana Semuels, The Safer, More Affordable Abortion Only Available 
in Two States, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business 
/archive/2014/10/the-safer-more-affordable-abortion-only-available-in-two-states 
/381321/ [https://perma.cc/4JUH-TUY6]. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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physician.97 As many as eighteen states have placed restrictions 
on telemedicine abortions,98 and require a physician to perform an 
in-person physical examination of the woman.99 State rules that 
effectively eliminate telemedicine abortions may simply limit med-
ication administration unless the physician is present at the time.100 
While there is little empirical evidence as to the outcomes of 
telemedicine abortions due to stringent state laws and regula-
tions,101 researchers studied telemedicine abortions in Iowa and 
concluded that these forms of abortions improved access to abor-
tions for women living in remote areas and reduced second-trimes-
ter abortions.102 Rules and laws that strictly target telemedicine 
abortions may be viewed as unconstitutional under the abortion 
doctrine’s “undue burden” analysis,103 therefore an antitrust suit 
may not be the proper remedy. However, telemedicine abortion 
rules are worth noting as an example of one common state pre-
scription rule that impedes online doctor services. 
B. In-Person Examination Requirements 
Some state medical boards place blanket bans on all forms of 
medication prescriptions without an in-person physical examination 
                                                                                                            
97 See The Abortion Pill, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparent 
hood.org/learn/abortion/the-abortion-pill [https://perma.cc/23M9-GE9R]. 
98 See Semuels, supra note 94. 
99 See GUTTMACHER INST., MEDICATION ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www 
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZER3-JYG5] 
(noting that, in eighteen states, the “clinician providing a medication abortion 
[must] be physically present during the procedure, thereby prohibiting the use 
of telemedicine to prescribe medication for abortion remotely.”). 
100 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 653-13.10(3) (2016), invalidated by Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 
2015) (requiring a physician to be physically present with the woman at the 
time the abortion-inducing drug is provided). 
101 See Semuels, supra note 94 (noting that fifteen states have banned tele-
medicine abortions). 
102 See Daniel Grossman et al., Changes in service delivery patterns after 
introduction of telemedicine provision of medical abortion in Iowa, 103 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 73 (2013). 
103 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 865 N.W.2d at 269 (holding 
the Iowa rule forbidding medicated abortions without an in-person physician 
present as unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to terminate her pregnancy). 
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of the patient.104 Proponents of these rules argue that forbidding 
online consultations that result in medication prescriptions is 
aimed at establishing and preserving a physician-patient rela-
tionship.105 That relationship has origins in contract law, but 
also involves fiduciary obligations on behalf of the physician.106 
Injury and prescription drug abuse prevention is the more com-
pelling argument behind rules that require an in-person physical 
examination.107 However, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention—the federal agency charged with public health re-
search—has noted that little identifiable information is available 
on the effectiveness of those statutes in preventing injury and 
drug abuse.108 
As of 2015, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia re-
quire a “physical examination” for prescribing a controlled sub-
stance.109 Some states will explicitly state that a patient-physician 
relationship is required.110 Indiana, for example, requires that “a 
physician shall not prescribe, dispense, or otherwise provide, or 
cause to be provided, any controlled substance to a person who 
the physician has never personally physically examined and 
diagnosed.”111 
Other states will reference the establishment of a patient-
physician relationship that, as defined by state law, must include a 
physical examination.112 For example, South Carolina requires a 
“proper physician-patient relationship.”113 That relationship re-
quires the physician to, “at a minimum ... personally perform and 
document an appropriate history and physical examination.”114 
                                                                                                            
104 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17. 
105 Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring a 
physical examination of the patient related to the creation of a physician-pa 
-tient relationship. See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 6 n.35. 
106 FURROW, supra note 89, at 188 n.3. 
107 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 2 n.10. 
110 Id. at 2. 
111 844 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-4-1 (2003). 
112 CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
113 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-113(A) (2015). 
114 Id. § 40-47-113(A)(1) (2015). 
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It is possible that broad rules that forbid prescriptions with-
out in-person contact by the physician will be deemed as anti-
competitive under § 1 of the Sherman Act if challenged by the 
appropriate telemedicine company, the FTC, or even a consumer.115 
III. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination, ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States.”116 Taken literally, nearly every agree-
ment between two or more parties can be considered a “restraint 
of trade;” thus the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions 
contained in § 1 to bar only “unreasonable restraints of trade.”117 
Yet, the Sherman Act is treated as a common law statute and 
the definition of an “unreasonable restraint of trade” evolves 
with economic theory and contemporary market conditions.118 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act as a con-
gressional effort to eliminate the “three evils” (“anticompetitive 
effects”) commonly produced by monopolies: (1) increased prices; 
(2) reduced output or a limitation on production; and (3) reduced 
quality.119 Plaintiffs can prove a prima facie case under § 1 by 
alleging that either (1) the defendant possesses market power;120 
or (2) the anticompetitive agreement creates at least one of the 
three anticompetitive effects.121 Moreover, the plaintiff’s claim 
                                                                                                            
115 See infra Part V.A. 
116 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015). 
117 NCAA v. Bd. Regents Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984). 
118 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 
(2007) (“Yet the Sherman Act’s use of ‘restraint of trade’ ‘invokes the common 
law itself, ... not merely the static content that the common law had assigned 
to the term in 1890.’”) (citing Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp. Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 732 (1988)). Stare decisis is less influential in Sherman Act cases be-
cause the interpretation of the statute evolves to meet modern understand-
ings and experiences, similar to the way the common law changes through 
time. See id. 
119 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911).  
120 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 
(1984) (“As an economic matter, market power exists whenever prices can be 
raised above the levels that would be charged in a competitive market.”). 
121 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (1993) (“The plaintiff 
may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of actual anticompetitive 
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for relief is subject to a higher pleading standard and must be 
“plausible on its face” and require “more than a sheer possibility” 
that the defendant acted unlawfully.122 
The health care industry is not exempt from § 1. The Sherman 
Act was intended “to embrace the widest array of conduct possi-
ble.”123 The Supreme Court found that restrictions on physician 
services have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and 
are thus subject to the restrictions of the Sherman Act.124 The 
Supreme Court made clear that it “refuse[s] to tolerate manifestly 
anticompetitive conduct simply because the health care industry 
is involved.”125 
When an anticompetitive agreement or concerted action126 is 
challenged under § 1, courts use a sliding scale of analyses to 
determine whether the agreement or action violates the law, and 
each analysis requires a different level of proof.127 At one end of 
                                                                                                            
effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in 
quality of goods or services .... [C]ourts typically allow proof of the defendant’s 
‘market power’ instead. Market power ... is essentially a ‘surrogate for detri-
mental effects.’”) (quotations omitted). 
122 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). To demonstrate that 
burden, the plaintiff’s complaint needs to produce facts that “raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level ... [and] enough factual matter (taken as 
true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). 
123 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (1993) (citing Goldfarb v. 
Va. St. Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975)). 
124 Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 739–40 (1976) (hold-
ing that an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce in the fur-
nishing of medical services in Raleigh, North Carolina, substantially impacted 
interstate commerce). 
125 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42 (citing Ariz. v. Maricopa Med. 
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348–51 (1982)). See, e.g., Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue 
Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981); Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 
528–29 (1943). 
126 To determine what constitutes a concerted action the relevant inquiry 
is “whether there is a ‘contract, combination ... , or conspiracy’ amongst ‘sepa-
rate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,’ such that the 
agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmak-
ing,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and thus of actual or 
potential competition.” Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 
183, 195 (2010) (citations omitted).  
127 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (“‘There is always 
something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding 
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the scale, certain types of agreements are considered “per se 
unreasonable” if they are proven to nearly always or always 
have a “pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue.”128 At the other end, courts most commonly analyze 
potentially anticompetitive agreements under the “rule of rea-
son,” which was well described by Justice Brandeis: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is 
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition. To determine that question the court must ordi-
narily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint 
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual 
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to 
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.129 
In between those analyses, a court may use the “quick-look” 
analysis when an observer with “even a rudimentary under-
standing of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets.”130 The type of analysis is an important consideration 
in determining whether an in-person prescription requirement 
survives § 1 scrutiny.131 
IV. FEDERAL ANTITRUST PREEMPTION OF 
STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Courts apply a two-stage inquiry in order to decide whether 
the Sherman Act preempts a state regulation.132 First, the 
                                                                                                            
scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for .... 
Nevertheless, the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’”) 
(quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507, at 
402 (1986)). 
128 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
129 Chi. Bd. Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
130 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. 
131 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update 
for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (finding that 
“[p]laintiffs almost never win under the rule of reason” when surveying all 
the rule of reason cases between 1999–2009). 
132 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 221a, at 46. 
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Sherman Act preempts a state statute if it “mandates or autho-
rizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the anti-
trust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a 
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply 
with the statute.”133 In other words, a state law is preempted if 
that law constitutes a per se violation of § 1.134 If so, then the 
statute is preempted unless it is saved under the second inquiry: 
the state action doctrine.135 In less obvious cases where the 
state’s action doesn’t constitute a per se violation—but could be 
perceivably inconsistent with the Sherman Act—the state or 
state agency must qualify for the state action doctrine exemp-
tion, or else be subject to the restrictions of the Sherman Act.136 
A. State Action Doctrine (Parker Immunity) 
The state action doctrine was first recognized in the 1943 
Supreme Court decision Parker v. Brown, and the doctrine has 
become synonymous with the term “Parker immunity.”137 Over 
the years, the doctrine has been accepted as a judicially created 
exception to federal antitrust laws.138 In simple terms, Parker 
immunity is afforded to state or local government actions that 
have intentional or foreseeable anticompetitive effects.139 A state 
agency only enjoys Parker immunity if it (1) clearly articulates a 
                                                                                                            
133 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). In devising the 
test, the Court applied similar principles to those used “in considering 
whether any state statute is preempted by a federal statute pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 659. 
134 See Matthew McDonald, Note, Antitrust Immunity Up in Smoke: 
Preemption, State Action, and the Master Settlement Agreement, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 97, 98 (2013). 
135 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 221a, at 46. 
136 See id. 
137 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
138 Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 7. Both the Judiciary and Congress have 
provided federal antitrust immunity to certain industries through statute and 
case law respectively. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 
(providing the insurance industry is immune to antitrust suits); Fed. Base-
ball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (deciding to grant Major 
League Baseball immunity to antitrust suits). 
139 See Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 2–3 (noting that Parker immunity strikes 
a balance between the principles of “federalism and state sovereignty”). 
198 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:175 
policy to displace federal antitrust law; and (2) is actively super-
vised by public state officials.140 
In Parker, the Supreme Court “interpreted the antitrust laws 
to confer immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when 
acting in their sovereign capacity.”141 The plaintiff, a raisin pro-
ducer and packager, sought to enjoin the state of California from 
enforcing a law that established state-run programs to market 
agricultural commodities produced within the state, and restricted 
competition among the growers by maintaining prices in the 
distribution of agricultural commodities.142 The plaintiff argued 
that, because 90–95 percent of the raisins grown in California are 
ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce,143 the Cali-
fornia law was an unlawful contract in restraint of trade among 
the several states.144 The Supreme Court upheld the California 
law because they interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit only 
“business combinations,” and not the state’s legislative authority.145 
Nearly forty years later, in California Retail Liquor Association 
v. Midcal Aluminum, the Supreme Court established a two-part 
test to determine if a restraint of trade is a policy of the state and 
afforded Parker immunity from federal antitrust laws.146 To qual-
ify for immunity, the restraint must be (1) “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and (2) “actively super-
vised by the State itself.”147 
For the first prong of the Midcal test, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hallie v. Eau Claire remains the controlling prece-
dent.148 The Court held that in order to pass the “clear articula-
tion” factor, the state legislature need not “expressly state in a 
statute or its legislative history that the legislature intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects” as long as 
                                                                                                            
140 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 217, at 386. 
141 N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015) (cit-
ing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51). 
142 Parker, 317 U.S. at 344, 346. 
143 Id. at 345. 
144 Id. at 350. 
145 Id. at 351. 
146 Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
147 Id.; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 217, at 386. The test from 
that case is often referred to as the “Midcal test.” Id. 
148 Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42–43 (1985). 
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the results of the anticompetitive effect were reasonably fore-
seeable.149 As of 2015, the Court has not formulated a test to 
define the clear articulation factor any further.150 
For the second prong of the Midcal test, the Supreme Court 
recently adopted a new standard for state agencies to determine 
whether they are “actively supervised by the state,” and thus, sub-
ject to Parker immunity.151 In N.C. Dental, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether an agency empowered by the state to regu-
late the practice of dentistry could “exclude nondentists from the 
market for teeth whitening services in North Carolina.”152 The 
Court responded in the negative and ruled that this particular 
state agency was a non-sovereign entity controlled by active 
market participants that were not actively supervised by the 
state.153 The Court further held that any “state board on which a 
controlling number of decision makers are active market partici-
pants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s 
active supervision requirement.”154 
The “active supervision” requirement for state professional 
boards is “flexible and context-dependent.”155 A court must de-
termine whether the “[s]tate’s review mechanisms provide ‘real-
istic assurance’ that a nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive con-
duct ‘promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s 
individual interests.’”156 The Court has identified “only a few 
constant requirements”157 to determine active supervision: 
 
(1) The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompet-
itive decision, not merely the procedure followed to produce it; 
(2) The supervisor must have the power to veto or modify 
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy; 
                                                                                                            
149 Id. 
150 See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2015) 
(noting that the clear articulation factor was “yet still [to] be defined”). 
151 Id. at 1121. 
152 Id. at 1109. 
153 Id. at 1120. 
154 Id. at 1114. The Court reasoned that active market participants “will 
pursue private interests in restraining trade” and “pose the very risk of self-
dealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was created to address.” Id. 
155 Id. at 1116. 
156 Id. (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988)). 
157 Id. 
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(3) The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate 
substitute for a decision by the state; 
(4) The state supervisor may not itself be an active market 
participant.158 
 
The Supreme Court’s articulation of the active supervision 
requirement is aimed to reduce the “risks licensing boards dom-
inated by market participants may pose to the free market.”159 
Market participants may “confus[e] their own interests with the 
State’s policy goals.”160 The Court likened agencies controlled by 
market participants to private trade associations with regulatory 
power, which “often have economic incentives to restrain compe-
tition ... [that may] have a serious potential to [cause] anticom-
petitive harm.”161 
With these requirements and policies in mind, state medical 
boards with a controlling majority of market participants are 
likely subject to the active supervision requirement162 and, if not 
actively supervised, will not enjoy Parker immunity. It is im-
portant to note that, if an actor does not enjoy Parker immunity, 
that determination will not ultimately confer liability; it simply 
means that an antitrust suit may proceed.163 Whether or not the 
antitrust suit would be successful is up to the litigants and the 
governing courts. 
B. The Impact of N.C. Dental on State Medical Boards 
As a result of the N.C. Dental decision, anti-competitive rules 
promulgated by state medical boards as they stand will likely not 
be afforded Parker immunity. Shortly after the N.C. Dental decision, 
commentators expressed interest that the ruling in N.C. Dental 
can be expanded to state medical boards if they are proven to be 
run by active market participants.164 Scope-of-practice rules are 
                                                                                                            
158 Id. at 1116–17. 
159 Id. at 1116. 
160 Id. at 1114. 
161 Id. 
162 See infra Part V.B. and accompanying text. 
163 See Robert Eisig Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond Im-
munity, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1829, 1837 (1985). 
164 Eric M. Fraser, Argument Analysis: Court wary of immunity for licens-
ing boards, but what about doctors?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www 
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of special importance because the holding in N.C. Dental is directly 
applicable to scope-of-practice determinations made by medical 
boards.165 The rules that determine under what circumstance a 
physician can prescribe a drug are considered scope-of-practice 
regulations.166 It follows that those types of rules promulgated by 
medical boards composed of a majority of active market partici-
pants fall within the holding of N.C. Dental.167 
After N.C. Dental, the FTC issued a report for states to guide 
them in efforts to insulate their professional boards.168 However, 
it is still unclear as to what state mechanisms provide “realistic 
assurance” that a state professional board is promoting state 
policy.169 As of early 2016, some states have begun to take steps 
to insulate their professional boards from the decision, and anti-
trust attorneys expect all states to enact some kind of legislation 
to address the holding in N.C. Dental.170 For example, Connecti-
cut passed a law that adds an active state supervision provision 
over actions of licensing boards that operate under the Connecticut 
Department of Public Health.171 Oklahoma took a different 
                                                                                                            
.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-analysis-court-wary-of-immunity-for-licens 
ing-boards-but-what-about-doctors/ [https://perma.cc/96RT-MS6A]. 
165 See Kathleen Foote, Immune No Longer: State Professional Boards 
Consider Their Options, 30 ANTITRUST MAG. 55, 56 (Fall 2015) (on file with 
author) (“Scope of practice determinations are the most obvious action to 
which NC Dental is applicable .... [B]ecause the Board’s action regarding 
teeth whitening was such a determination.”) (quotations omitted). 
166 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. 
168 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF 
STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS (Oct. 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance 
/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/75F9-DF7A] [herein-
after FTC GUIDANCE]. 
169 N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015). 
170 See Foote, supra note 165, at 56 (discussing the various paths that dif-
ferent states have taken to protect the rulemaking ability of their professional 
boards); see also Alexandra W. Jabs, Note, North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners v. FTC: When Will Enough Active State Supervision Be 
Enough, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 44, 73 (2016) (highlighting the efforts of 
the state of California which created an independent review commission to 
satisfy the active supervision requirement). 
171 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-14(f) (2015); see also Foote, supra note 165, at 
56 n.11. 
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route—the governor issued an executive order that requires the 
state Attorney General to review all non-rulemaking decisions 
by licensing boards.172 It is unclear how courts will react to these 
measures.173 The rules promulgated by un-insulated medical 
boards dominated by market participants, however, will likely 
not enjoy Parker immunity.174 
While the FTC issued a guidance document covering what 
they view to be sufficient to insulate a state medical board, that 
does not necessarily mean that a board will receive Parker im-
munity.175 It is up to the judiciary to interpret the scope of the 
holding in N.C. Dental.176 Moreover, the FTC may or may not 
decide to file suit if a medical board follows their guidance.177 
However, a private party with standing is not bound by a guid-
ance document and has the option to file suit.178 The following 
section highlights a recent case that may open the door for tele-
medicine companies to challenge anticompetitive state prescrip-
tion rules, and speculates further challenges. 
V. STRATEGIES FOR § 1 CHALLENGES TO STATE 
MEDICAL BOARD PRESCRIPTION RULES 
A recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Texas illustrates that telemedicine companies may succeed in 
                                                                                                            
172 OKLA. EXEC. DEP’T, EXEC. ORDER NO. 2015–33 (2015), http://www.sos 
.ok.gov/documents/executive/993.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC7L-AKSK]; see also 
Foote, supra note 165, at 56 n.13. 
173 Kathleen Foote, the Senior Assistant Attorney General and Antitrust 
Chief in the California Department of Justice, noted that, in response to the 
N.C. Dental holding, “there is increasing recognition that it will take litiga-
tion—maybe a lot of it—to set the goalposts on the new playing field.” Foote, 
supra note 165, at 57. 
174 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. 
175 See FTC GUIDANCE supra note 168 n.* (“The Federal Trade Commis-
sion is not bound by this Staff guidance and reserves the right to rescind it at 
a later date.”). 
176 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1123. 
177 See supra note 175. 
178 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL CH. 8: INDUSTRY GUID-
ANCE 2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative 
-staff-manuals/ch08industryguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/J67C-2FT2] (“Un-
like a trade regulation rule (TRR) (see OM Ch. 7, ‘Rulemaking’), a guide does 
not have the force or effect of law and is not legally binding on the Commis-
sion or on the public in an enforcement action.”). 
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challenging state rules that require in-person physical examina-
tions for prescriptions under § 1 of the Sherman Act.179 In Teladoc 
v. Texas Medical Board, the nation’s largest telehealth provider180 
was successful in enjoining the Texas Medical Board from promul-
gating a new rule that required a “face-to-face examination prior 
to prescription of a dangerous drug or controlled substance.”181 
The crux of Teladoc’s argument was that the Texas rule would 
eliminate Teladoc physicians from providing health care, which 
would negatively impact “not just the competitor physicians, but 
consumers, [creating] a classic antitrust injury.”182 
That court held that, under either a quick-look analysis or 
rule of reason analysis, Teladoc’s claim succeeded in proving the 
necessary elements for a preliminary injunction.183 Teladoc met 
its burden of proving that the Texas rule had an anti-competitive 
effect by producing higher premiums and decreased choices.184 In 
response, the Texas Medical Board offered a single justification 
that the anticompetitive rule would lead to improved quality of 
medical care.185 The Teladoc case provides the framework for a 
potential lawsuit against rules promulgated by state medical boards 
that restrict a physician’s ability to prescribe medications with-
out an in-person examination of the patient. A hypothetical chal-
lenge to that type of law is discussed in the following sections. 
A. Standing 
In any § 1 case, plaintiffs must “prove injury of the type that 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from 
                                                                                                            
179 Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015).  
180 What is Teladoc?, TELADOC, https://www.teladoc.com/ [https://perma.cc 
/3JGC-RS28] (providing that Teladoc is the largest and first telehealth pro-
vider in the United States). 
181 See Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
That case was procedurally unique because the merits of the antitrust issues 
were analyzed because the defendant declined to assert the affirmative de-
fense of Parker immunity in the early pleading stages. Id. at 535. This Note, 
however, argues that future antitrust challenges would be successful in simi-
lar circumstances even if immunity is pleaded by the medical board, because 
state medical boards will not likely be afforded Parker immunity. 
182 Id. at 536–37. 
183 Id. at 537. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 538. 
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that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”186 Telemedicine 
companies who provide online doctor consultations are potential 
plaintiffs because they are being excluded from the market for 
physician services of medication prescriptions. While this Note 
focuses on telemedicine companies, there may be additional po-
tential plaintiffs. Prescription medication consumers are harmed 
because they are directly affected by the higher prices of in-person 
visits, thus they could possibly bring a suit seeking redress.187 
Additionally the FTC could file suit because they have jurisdic-
tion over antitrust suits concerning “professional services” within 
the health care industry.188 
B. Pleading Challenges and Proving a Prima Facie Case 
Potential plaintiffs will bear the burden of production to estab-
lish a prima facie case that the rule resulted in anti-competitive 
effects.189 A plaintiff will have to prove that a defendant state 
medical board possesses market power, or that the rule creates 
(1) increased prices for physicians’ services for prescriptions; (2) de-
creased output in the market for physicians’ services for prescrip-
tions; or (3) reduced quality of medical care.190 As evidenced by 
the Teladoc lawsuit, state rules that prohibit physicians from 
prescribing medication without an in-person examination of the 
                                                                                                            
186 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 492 U.S. 489 (1977). 
187 See Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 537 (Elimination of physicians provid-
ing healthcare would thus negatively impact .... consumers, a classic anti-
trust injury.”). Thus, any person seeking a prescription may have a viable 
cause of action. 
188 Although the FTC and Antitrust Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) both have jurisdiction to enforce federal antitrust law, 
both agencies have agreed to separately pursue certain industries and prac-
tices. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & ANTITRUST DIV. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, MEMO-
RANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FED. TRADE COMM’N AND THE ANTITRUST 
DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR 
INVESTIGATIONS 8 (Mar. 2002), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr 
/legacy/2007/07/17/10170.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS4B-V8YS]. The FTC has juris-
diction over antitrust suits concerning professional services within the health 
care industry. See id. 
189 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1504b, at 
358 (2d ed. 2003). 
190 See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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patient likely increase overall costs for physician services.191 Po-
tential plaintiffs will have to provide evidence that online doctor 
services are cheaper than regular physician visits.192 Moreover, 
those rules are likely to reduce output of physician services.193 
To sustain their burden, plaintiffs will have to provide evidence, 
likely in the form of affidavits or research studies, that physi-
cians who conduct online visits with patients treat more patients 
than without those services.194 Lastly, it will be difficult for a 
plaintiff to prove that online doctor services result in increased 
quality of care.195 
To prevent scrutiny under § 1, a state medical board will have 
to assert Parker immunity and must prove that they (1) mani-
fested a clearly articulated policy to displace federal antitrust law 
and (2) are actively supervised by public state officials.196 It is 
likely that the clear articulation element is met because it is rea-
sonably foreseeable that a law requiring an in-person examination 
of a patient for prescriptions would be anticompetitive and exclude 
online services from the market of prescription services.197 Pre-
scription drugs can only be prescribed by certain qualified people 
(such as physicians).198 Thus, they are inherently anticompetitive 
because they exclude other people from the prescribing market. 
                                                                                                            
191 Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 537 (finding that Teladoc submitted evi-
dence that their remote doctor consultations typically cost $40, whereas the 
average cost to the physician or emergency room was $145 or $1957 respec-
tively). Thus, restricting Teladoc’s telemedicine services would result in in-
creased prices. Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. (stating Teladoc submitted physician affidavits declaring that their 
remote doctor consulting services allowed certain doctors to treat more patients). 
194 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 189, ¶ 1504b at 358. 
195 Plaintiffs will need to introduce evidence that online doctor visits in-
crease the quality of health care services and are superior in that regard to 
in-person visits. Although online visits have advantages, no identifiable cred-
ible information supports the proposition that they increase the quality of 
health care services. 
196 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
197 See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2015) 
(“[A] policy may satisfy this test yet still to be defined at so high level of gen-
erality as to leave open critical questions about how and to what extent the 
market should be regulated.”). 
198 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2015). 
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The active supervision element, however, will be highly fact-
dependent and require litigators to test their skills.199 The best 
litigation route for a plaintiff would be to frame their argument 
against active supervision by using the factors identified by the 
Supreme Court in N.C. Dental.200 
C. Per Se Analysis 
In any § 1 challenge to an anticompetitive practice, a court 
must decide which analysis should govern the case.201 It is un-
likely that a per se analysis would be used in potential challenges 
to state prescription rules, because courts are generally hesitant 
to apply a per se analysis to rules adopted by professional asso-
ciations.202 It is not impossible, however, for a court to apply a 
per se analysis to a defendant in the health care industry.203 
A potential plaintiff would benefit from this analysis because 
it is the most plaintiff-friendly.204 The most plausible argument 
to make would be that rules requiring in-person physical exami-
nations constitute horizontal price fixing.205 That type of rule may 
                                                                                                            
199 See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116–17 
(2015) (providing a vague set of factors to determine what actions constitute 
“active supervision”). 
200 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
202 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“We have 
been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unrea-
sonable per se”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
695 (1978) (holding that an engineering society’s ethical canon that prohibited 
competitive bidding was analyzed under the rule of reason, not under the per 
se analysis). 
203 Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1982) (apply-
ing the per se rule to a group of competing physicians who set maximum fees 
they could claim in payment for health services provided to policyholders of 
certain insurance plans). 
204 See Thomas B. Leary, Paper, A Structured Outline for the Analysis of 
Horizontal Agreements, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 3–4, 2004), https://www.ftc 
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/structured-outline-analysis 
-horizontal-agreements/chairsshowcasetalk.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUB9-ZX93] 
(“Experienced antitrust counselors recognize that the method of analysis is 
often outcome-determinative; plaintiffs tend to win per se cases and defendants 
tend to win rule-of-reason cases.”). 
205 Courts differentiate between two types of restraints: horizontal and 
vertical. A horizontal restraint is “an agreement between competitors at the 
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be considered a concerted action to maintain the price of physician 
services for medication prescriptions at the current level required 
by in-person hospital visits, whereas online doctor visits would 
greatly reduce that amount if they were allowed to compete in 
the market.206 Thus, there is an agreement between competitors 
(physicians) at the same level of the market structure to keep 
doctor visit costs high, constituting horizontal price fixing.207 
However, a court would likely reject this argument because a 
potential defendant could raise the procompetitive justifications 
of either (1) increased quality of care or (2) drug abuse and injury 
prevention. The medical board would need to offer evidence which 
demonstrates that either of those two justifications would result in 
market efficiencies, thus precluding the use of the per se analysis.208 
The first justification, increased quality of care, would likely 
be hard to prove or impossible to categorize as a justification, 
because public safety is generally not considered a redeeming 
cognizable justification in Sherman Act cases.209 In the Teladoc 
case, the state medical board offered that same procompetitive 
                                                                                                            
same level of the market structure,” while a vertical restraint refers to “com-
binations of persons at different levels of the market structure.” United States v. 
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Horizontal price fixing is typically 
considered per se unreasonable. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 
493 U.S. 411, 436 n.19 (1990) (“[H]orizontal price-fixing ... has been consid-
ered a per se violation for many decades.”). But horizontal price fixing is not 
always considered per se unreasonable, especially if an industry requires 
horizontal restraints to produce the product at all. See NCAA v. Bd. Regents 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984) (refusing to apply a per se analysis 
to horizontal price fixing on college football television contracts because the 
live college football industry required horizontal restraints in order to pro-
duce the product of live college football). 
206 See supra notes 50–53. 
207 See supra note 205. 
208 Once the defendant identifies a procompetitive justification, also called 
a “redeeming virtue,” then the per se rule is inapplicable because it only ap-
plies to agreements that have a “pernicious effect” on competition and “lack of 
any redeeming virtue.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) 
(emphasis added). 
209 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978) (“[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the com-
petitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favor-
ing competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of 
an industry.”). 
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justification.210 However, the court cited a string of Supreme Court 
decisions and held that public safety is not a sufficient justifica-
tion in § 1 cases.211 Thus, any public safety justification, includ-
ing improved quality of medical care, will likely not be sufficient 
as a procompetitive justification. 
The second justification of injury and drug abuse is compel-
ling because some prescription drugs, such as opioid pain reliev-
ers (OPRs) and other narcotics, are dangerous drugs212 that need 
to be regulated tightly.213 OPRs are highly addictive and commonly 
abused; examples include oxycodone, hydrocodone, and metha-
done.214 According to the CDC, three-quarters of prescription drug 
overdose deaths in 2011 were attributed to OPRs.215 A recent study 
demonstrates that OPR abuse has a serious economic strain on 
the health care industry, due to the excess medical costs associ-
ated with substance abuse treatment programs, prevention pro-
grams, and research.216 In total, annual health care costs of OPR 
abuse accounted for approximately 55.7 billion dollars in the United 
States.217 Thus, it is conceivable that there could be cost savings 
associated with rules that require an in-person examination. 
                                                                                                            
210 Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 538 (2015) (“The 
sole justification the [Texas Medical Board] offers is that the New Rule 190.8 
will lead to improved quality of medical care.”). 
211 Id. at 540 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695; FTC v. 
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)). 
212 There is ample evidence that those drugs are more commonly abused 
and, consequently, more dangerous than other prescription drugs. See CDC 
STUDY, supra note 17, at 1; Howard G. Birnbaum, et al., Societal Costs of 
Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 
PAIN MED. 657, 657 (2011), http://painmedicine.oxfordjournals.org/content 
/painmedicine/12/4/657.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSW2-W57Q]. 
213 Several federal agencies regulate OPRs. The Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) is the lead federal agency that deals with controlled sub-
stances and narcotics. Drug Enforcement Administration, FED. REG., https:// 
www.federalregister.gov/agencies/drug-enforcement-administration [https:// 
perma.cc/L855-LQXQ]. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is also 
beginning to explore and assess new policies to further regulate OPRs. See 
Califf, FDA top officials call for sweeping review of agency opioid policies, 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/News 
room/PressAnnouncements/ucm484765.htm [https://perma.cc/2TWS-RWVE]. 
214 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1. 
215 Id. 
216 See Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 660. 
217 Id. at 661. 
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Injury and drug abuse is a compelling justification, and the 
per se analysis will likely not apply because the Supreme Court 
only applies the “demanding” per se rule in obvious cases.218 
Once the defendant introduces some justification for the anti-
competitive conduct, the court will not use a per se analysis.219 If 
the argument for a per se analysis fails, then a court will look at 
the case under a quick-look or rule of reason analysis. 
D. Quick-Look Analysis 
Potential plaintiffs could argue that a court should apply a 
quick-look analysis.220 A court will use the quick-look analysis 
when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would 
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”221 
The burden-shifting framework of the quick-look analysis in-
volves several steps. First, the court determines if the restraint 
is “inherently suspect.”222 Second, if the restraint is inherently 
suspect, then the defendant is charged with the burden of articu-
lating a “legally cognizable competitive justification.”223 Third, 
the plaintiff has to address that justification, which they can 
easily do by either (a) simply showing the restraint harmed con-
sumers (without having to adduce evidence), or (b) demonstrating 
that the restraint had likely anticompetitive effects.224 Fourth, the 
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hefty evidentiary burden switches to the defendant to show that 
the restraint did not harm consumers or the procompetitive jus-
tification outweighs the effects on consumers.225 
A court could apply the quick-look analysis, as they did with 
the agreement in National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States, where the Supreme Court held that a professional 
association’s agreement was not price fixing, but appeared to be 
so similar that “no elaborate industry analysis [was] required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agree-
ment.”226 However, it is unclear if a court will deem an in-person 
prescription rule as inherently suspect, because this area of anti-
trust litigation is novel and the legal standard behind the quick-
look analysis is cloudy and rarely applied.227 The defense attorneys’ 
resources and the availability of reliable evidence would likely 
determine whether quick-look analysis is used. 
E. Rule of Reason Analysis 
Under a rule of reason analysis, a potential plaintiff would 
incur a costly legal battle.228 A plaintiff’s success under the rule 
of reason is possible,229 but will most likely not occur.230 The rule 
of reason is the preferred standard for § 1 cases, requiring the judge 
to weigh the harms and benefits of the anticompetitive act.231 To 
establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs would have to allege the 
defendant medical board possessed sufficient market power or 
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the rule in contention resulted in increased prices, lower output, 
or lower quality of care for the product of physicians’ services.232 
A plaintiff’s easiest method would be to prove that the state 
medical board’s rulemaking abilities confer total control over the 
physician’s services market in a given state. To do so, a plaintiff 
would have to define the relevant market, which includes (1) the 
relevant geographic market and (2) the relevant product mar-
ket.233 In any potential case, the relevant geographic market is 
defined as the state where the rule was in effect.234 The relevant 
product market would be physician services because telemedi-
cine physicians compete with urgent care physicians, hospital-
based physicians, and private physicians.235 
Alternatively, a possibly more difficult route for a plaintiff 
would be to prove that the contested rule resulted in higher prices, 
lower output, or reduced quality of care for physicians’ services.236 
This claim would be difficult to assess because a potential plain-
tiff would need statistical evidence about online doctor services 
in that particular market before the rule was adopted, or possi-
bly use evidence from other jurisdictions where it is available. 
If the plaintiff introduces a prima facie case, a defendant 
could rebut by producing evidence that the rule creates benefits 
that outweigh the harms produced by the plaintiff’s case.237 As 
stated earlier, the defendant’s best option would be to prove the rule 
aims to reduce drug abuse and promote injury prevention, thereby 
reducing medical costs associated with those problems.238 
Even if a court was willing to accept that justification in de-
fense of a state prescription rule, the plaintiff would still have 
the opportunity to prove that the alleged benefits of the rule are 
not necessary to achieve its goals.239 That inquiry has two parts: 
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(1) whether the restraint actually promotes the legitimate inter-
ests; and (2) whether that restraint can be pursued in a manner 
to restrain competition less.240 
If the in-person prescription rules are promulgated to reduce 
drug abuse and injury prevention, then that justification is likely a 
legitimate interest under the state’s police power authority.241 
However, it is possible that the rule could be viewed as overly 
restrictive if it forbids all prescriptions resulting from an online 
consultation. A less restrictive rule could, in effect, place a phys-
ical examination requirement on only truly dangerous prescrip-
tions. A less restrictive law could require physical examinations 
for only OPRs,242 and allow for online consultations for other 
prescriptions. This type of law would, in effect, be a less restric-
tive method for a state to enforce physical examination rules if 
those rules were adopted to prevent injury and drug abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Telecommunication technologies and patient-care models 
have advanced to the point where online doctor services provide 
a cost effective method of health care. Although some medical 
professionals may advocate against online consultation services 
for prescription drugs in favor of the old system of in-person 
visits, a dogmatic reliance on the traditional health care delivery 
system will not stand up to a § 1 challenge unless proven to pro-
mote an efficient market. The Sherman Act, like the common 
law, “evolves to meet the dynamics of present economic condi-
tions.”243 Although online doctor visits are a novel form of medical 
care, they should not be ignored. Online doctor visits have prom-
ising benefits for competition and health outcomes because they 
are cheaper than in-person visits, easier to schedule, and reduce 
travel times.244 Telemedicine companies have standing to sue 
state medical boards over rules that require in-person physical 
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examinations and should strongly consider taking that action if 
it would allow them to expand their services. Although state level 
legislation requiring more active supervision could affect the 
antitrust analysis, legislative change is often slow to develop. 
Furthermore, it is questionable if states will adopt a truly active 
model of supervision, the definition of which is amorphous and 
currently undefined. The possibilities of this form of “impact 
litigation” in the health care field could be advantageous to pro-
viders, consumers, and the market at large. 
